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Abstract
Fear of ﬂoating, a policy taht usually intends to stabilize foreign debt,
can destabilize it. The conclusion is drawn with a small open economy
model thtis based on the ﬁnancial accelerator and that is perturbed to
analyze a sudden stop to captial ﬂows. The model introduces exchange
rate exposed sectorial balance sheets and sectorial stock and ﬂow consis-
tency. The policy implication is that during a sudden stop the exchange
rate should be allowed to ﬂoat. A case can be made for fear of ﬂoating if
there are plans to reduce inﬂation.
JEL classiﬁcation: E42; E58; F30; F41; G15; H62; H63
Keywords: Sectorial balance sheets; Debt sustainability; Inﬂation tar-
geting; Sudden stops; New open economy models; Counter-cyclical poli-
cies; Country risk; Liability dollarization; Fear of ﬂoating
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In an emerging market economy, the government’s balance sheet can make the
diﬀerence between solvency and bankruptcy and the exchange rate is the key
asset price in determining the government’s net worth. Althoght the exchange
rate is a key asset price in an emerging market, the literature on the ﬁnancial
accelerator has not yet included the eﬀect of the exchange rate on the balance
sheet of the government.
In this paper, the balance sheet of the government, along with the other sec-
tor’s balance sheets, is incorporated into a New Open Economy Model (NOEM).
The NOEM has sectoral stock and ﬂow consistency and is based on the ﬁnancial
accelerator.
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1The literature on the ﬁnancial accelerator, which originated in Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), was extended to the case of the small open economy
by Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2000), and Céspedes, Chang and Velasco
(2000). There is a two country version in Gilchrist (2003), and a multicounty
version in Gilchrist, Hairault and Kempf (2004).
While these papers dealt with the eﬀect of the exchange rate on the balance
sheet of entrepreneurs, other papers extend the ﬁnancial accelerator to other
sectors. Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe (2002), for instance, explain ﬁnancial
crises as a consequence of the cycles in residential investment and dealt with
the balance sheet of the household. Choi and Cook (2004) foxus on exchange
rate balance sheet eﬀects in the banking sector. This paper deals with exchange
rate balance sheet eﬀects in all sectors.
The eﬀect of the exchange rate on ﬁnancial wealth played an important
role during the emerging market crisis at the end of the century. The price of
capital, central to the theory of the ﬁnancial accelerator, may have played a role
in explaining the drop in output and demand. But in the narrative descriptions
of crises the asset price that most abruptly changed net worth was the exchange
rate. In this paper, less emphasis will be given to one of the more relevant
features of ﬁnancial crises in mature markets and in the ﬁnancial accelerator
literature −the role of physical capital and its price−, and instead one of the
features widely believed to have an important eﬀect on ﬁnancial wealth during
crises in emerging markets −the eﬀe c to ft h ee x c h a n g er a t eo nﬁnancial wealth−
will be studied.
The paper is also related to the literature on crises, in particular to the
third generation of crisis models which originated in Krugman (1999). Krug-
man (1999) considers a type of perturbation and a policy experiment like those
studied here: a change in market sentiment and the diﬀerence that it makes to
“let the exchange rate go or stabilize it”. He also considers balance sheet eﬀects
in banks and in the corporate sector. In this paper, these issues are dealt with
within the framework of a NOEM, and with an explicit treatment of the balance
sheets of the government and the central bank.
The NOEM literature, launched by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995), has been
surveyed by Lane (2001) and Sarno (2001). New open economy models, like the
one developed by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2001), are characterized by price
rigidities, monopolistic competition, and market frictions. Goodfriend and King
(1997) call closed economy models with these features, like Woodford (2003),
the new neoclassical synthesis.
Besides sectorial balance sheets, other features that will be incorporated
into the NOEM of this paper are emerging market issues such as sudden stops,
pro-cyclical policies, and the nature of the eﬀect of monetary policy on ﬁscal
policy.
Consider, ﬁrst, sudden stops. When they occur, they become “the central
issue” −in words of Krugman (1999)− of macroeconomic policy. A sudden
stop is characterized by a large, sudden reversal in the inﬂow of capital, a
sharp increase in the trade balance, a large drop in output, an even larger drop
in absorption and an increase in poverty. Sudden stops spread through out
2emerging markets during 1997-2002. The stylized facts of sudden stops have
been dealt with by Edwards (2004), Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2003) and
Calvo and Reinhart (2000a).
Based on asset pricing theory, Mendoza and Smith (2002, 2004) propose a
model where sudden stops are endogenous and anticipated. Although in our
model sudden stops are exogenous and unanticipated, our paper, like theirs,
reproduces a collapse in output, absorption and in the value of the currency. Our
characterization of sudden stops belongs to the family of models with monitoring
costs and ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀects surveyed by Arellano and Mendoza (2002).
In our model, sudden stops are endogenous to market sentiment. Market
sentiment, in turn, is a short cut for two elements. First, the apetite for risk
on the part of investors and, second, the investor’s perception of risk in the
particular emerging market. A change in the perception of risk in the assets
denominated in domestic currency increases the country risk premium. Whether
the crisis occurs under a ﬂoating exchange rate, −as in Brazil in 2002− or under
a hard peg as in Hong Kong in 1997−, or under a speculative attack on a crawling
band −as in the emerging market crises of 1997-1999−, it is characterized by
capital outﬂow, increased trade balance, drop in output, and an even larger
drop in absorption.1
Consider now the second emerging market issue, pro-cyclical policies. In the
case of interest rate policy, pro-cyclical policcy is fear of ﬂoating. As shown
by Calvo and Reinhart (2000b), fear of ﬂoating is pervasive. Countries move
interest rates (and also international reserves) to such extent that exchange
rate regimes that are, de jure, ﬂoating are, de facto, rigid. In this paper we call
the increase in the policy interest rate necesary to maintain the exchange rate
pro-cyclical because it emphasizes the drop in output.
Pro-cyclical interest rate policy during a sudden stops have a cost that is
not small. The cost is what Krugman (1999) calls the “decapitation of the
entrepreneurial class”. Absorption and output drop, the recession, in turn, also
decapitates tax revenue. In addition, debt sustainability calls for pro-cyclical
ﬁscal policy.
Pro-cyclical monetary and ﬁscal policies were at the core of the International
Monetary Fund’s strategy during crises. Williamson (2004) points out that
“the issue of whether the IMF erred in urging higher interest rates on the crisis
countries has never been deﬁnitively resolved in the way the ﬁscal issue was,
where the IMF itself admitted it had made a mistake in initially pushing for
a tightening.” We hope to shade some light on the issue of the higher interest
rates in this paper. We show that tight interest rates at a time of sudden stops
exacerbate the increase in the government debt to GDP ratio. It is also shown
that ﬂoating the exchange rate stabilizes government debt and does not seem
to constitute a risk to inﬂation beyond one that is transitory.
Consider, ﬁnally, the eﬀect of monetary policy on ﬁscal policy. As Wood-
ford (2003) argues, in the context of advanced economies, the most important
eﬀect of monetary policy on ﬁscal policy is the role of the interest rate on debt
1For a treatment of the transfer problem see Krugman (1999) and Eichengreen (1994).
3dynamics. In this paper, we show that in emerging markets as well, one of the
most important issues about the eﬀect of monetary policy on ﬁscal policy during
crises in emerging markets is the eﬀect of the monetary policy mix −interest
rates and the exchange rate− on debt dynamics. It is sometimes believed that
in less developed economies seignorage revenue is still the most important issue
in the conduct of monetary policy. However, during the current period of price
stability, and after a decade of ﬁnancial innovation, seignorage can hardly be
the exclusive or most important concern of monetary policy. In this study we
seek to argue, as Woodford (2003) does for the case of advanced economies, that
in emerging markets also a relevant ﬁscal dimension of monetary policy is the
eﬀect of the monetary policy mix on debt dynamics.
Also in relation to the issue of monetary and ﬁscal policies, it bears emphasis
that in our framework, inﬂation is determined by marginal cost, the gap of the
law of one price and inﬂation expectations; not by money. The advantage of a
theory of inﬂation based on the Phillips curve and not on money is that it is a
theory that is relevant for the conduct of monetary policy in the short run, and
to explain not large changes in inﬂation but the evolution of inﬂa t i o nw i t h i na
range of stability, which is the emphasis in the practice of inﬂation targeting.
Even though the theory of inﬂation in our model is not monetary, the monetary
base is included in the model in order to capture the eﬀect of changes in the
quantity of money on the portfolio of the central bank and of the household.2
The model in the paper takes the analytical tools that are commonly used to-
day in isolation in policy making institutions −ﬂow models of inﬂation targeting,
stock and ﬂow ﬁscal sustainability analysis, and macroeconomic programing−
and makes them work in a single framework. A framework of the type presented
here may help coordinate inﬂation targeting and ﬁscal responsibility policies.
Under the current practice of inﬂation targeting, for instance, macroeconomic
models often provide a common language that helps policy makers communi-
cate. Models of this type may also help ﬂesh out what has been called the
“story”, which is a coherent dynamic argument about where the economy is,
what the impact of the foregoing shocks is, and what the role of policy can
be. The story is usually the main thrust of the inﬂation targeting report. It
also helps in accountability since past actions can be evaluated in light of the
information available at the moment the decisions were made. A model of the
type presented in this paper may, we hope, help build consistent projections for
variables relevant to the monetary and ﬁscal authorities.
One important issue that is beyond the scope of the paper is a separate
treatment of the balance sheet of the banking sector. In incorporating the
banking sector into a general equilibrium model, we follow the approach of
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999): there is no explicit treatment of the
balance sheet of banks, but, instead, there is a pair of equations that represent
the role of banks in the model. One equation is for the strength of the ﬁrm’s
balance sheet; the other one, for the premium on borrowing.3 In our model,
2Nonetheless, as argued by King (2002), in the long run a superneutral model and the
quantitative theory are not incompatible.
3Although banks are not explicitly modeled, the projections for price, ﬂow and stock
4the banking sector is part of the private sector −which is represented by the
household.
There are ﬁve sections in the paper including this introduction. Sectorial
balance sheets and sectorial stock and ﬂow consistency are developed in section
two. The remainder of the model is presented in section three. The fear of
ﬂoating and free market approaches to the exchange rate under a sudden stop
are studied in section four. The conclusions are given in section ﬁve.
2 The exchange rate and ﬁnancial net worth
A lot of mileage can be gained by studying budget constraints and balance
sheets alone without regard to optimizing behavior. In this section, the balance
sheet and budget constraints of the economy and the sectors are combined to
derive expressions for the law of evolution of overall and sectorial ﬁnancial net
worth. A simple equation is proposed for the valuation eﬀect of the exchange
rate on net foreign assets.
At this point some deﬁnitions are in order. The domestic nominal risk free
rate, i
f
t , or policy rate, is determined by the monetary authority independently.
The foreign risk free rate, i
f∗
t , is determined by the foreign monetary authority,
and in the model it is also the return received by those domestic residents that
invest in the foreign country.
The country risk, φt, is the premium paid by a domestic issuer of debt, or
the premium received by the holder of that debt, whether a domestic or foreign
resident.
The domestic and foreign risky rates are deﬁned as
it = i
f





These are the rates paid by an issuer of domestic and foreign debt respec-
tively, or the interest received by the holder of these claims.
The expected return on assets in the two currencies is equalized by the
uncovered interest parity condition. In other words, the exchange rate ﬂoats so
that the expected return on the assets denominated in both currencies is the
same.4
The average maturity of assets and liabilities in the domestic economy is T.
In order to deal with the maturity of debt and assets in the model, it is assumed
variables that can be produced by a model of this type, can be used, in line with Hoggart
(2003), to build stress tests for the banking sector. For a survey of stress tets that have been
designed for the ﬁnancial sector see also Sorge (2004).
4Were the exchange rate ﬁxed, the risk free rates, domestic and foreign, would be equal









t + φt w o u l dh o l de v e r yp e r i o d .
5that every quarter each agent pays (receives) the interest rate of maturity T on






rt + % (2)




t deﬁne maturity T risk free and risky rates in real terms in the foreign
economy.
2.1 The valuation eﬀect in the aggregate balance sheet
Assuming there is only one agent in the economy,5 and assuming, for the mo-
ment, that debt matures in one period, the ﬂow budget constraint may be
written
PtCT






t is absorption, Yt is gross domestic product, ST
t is net transfers in the
balance of payments, i∗
t is the one period foreign risky interest rate, At is net
foreign assets, and Et is the exchange rate.
Let Qt = EtP∗
t /Pt b et h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ea n dl e t1+r∗
t ≡ (1 + i∗
t)/(1 +
π∗
t+1|t) be the real interest rate. It is useful to express the second term on the
right hand side of the equation as a function of 1+χt =( Qt/Qt−1)4, which is
the rate of depreciation of the real exchange rate in annual terms. Dividing by
Pt,
CT










For debt sustainability analysis, we will deal with the balanced growth path6.









at−1 + at ' −(1 + r∗
t−1 + χt −
_
γ)at−1 + at − sT
t (4)
where ﬂow and stock variables denoted with small case letters indicate percent
of steady state output, yt ≡ Yt/
_
Y t is output expressed in percent of steady state
output,s t = yt −cT
t is the trade balance, and
_
γ i st h er a t eo fg r o w t ho fs t e a d y
state output.
5Although the model has three agents, to facilitate the exposition, in this section we deal
with an economy with a single agent.
6In the balanced growth path, the long run growth of ﬂo wa n ds t o c kv a r i a b l e si se q u a lt o
the rate of growth of trend output and the shares in trend output are constant. Let
∧
xt be the
percentage deviation of variable x from the steady state and let
_
x be the steady state share of
variable x in output. It can be shown that the deviation of ﬂow and stock variables measured




xt. One of the advantages of the measure xt is that
all variables are in the same numerare. This simpliﬁes some algebraic expressions and also
facilitates the reading of the impulse response functions.
6As there is no capital stock in the economy, agents hold only ﬁnancial assets
and the aggregate balance sheet can be written,
at = nt (5)
where at is net foreign assets and nt is ﬁnancial net worth.
Now, we combine the budget constraint (4) and the aggregate balance sheet
(5) to obtain the law of evolution of net worth
nt =( 1+χt)nt−1 + ss
t (6)
where, the current account is
ss
t = st + si
t + sT
t (7)







t is net transfers in the balance of payments. All of these terms are
expressed in units of steady state output.
Equation (6) shows that ﬁnancial net worth or net foreign assets will change
along with changes in the current account and also along with changes in the
exchange rate. The eﬀect of the exchange rate on the valuation of net foreign
assets, the valuation eﬀect, hardly been explored in the literature, two exceptions
are Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) and Gourinchas and Rey (2005).
If net foreign assets are negative, an exchange rate depreciation causes the
country’s net worth to deteriorate. The larger the country’s un-hedged debt,
the greater will be the impact of exchange rate depreciation on net worth.
The eﬀect of the exchange rate on net worth is often called a “valuation
eﬀect.” Althought this name suggest the eﬀect is pure accounting, it actually is
not. An exchange rate depreciation does change the value of debt (or wealth)
in terms of the domestic good.
In our framework, the valuation eﬀect does not belong to ﬂow accounting
but to “stock valuation.” That is why the choice has been made to include the
valuation eﬀect, not in the equation of the current account (7), but in the law
o fe v o l u t i o no fn e tw o r t h( 6 ) .
2.2 The valuation eﬀect in sectorial balance sheets
Three agents are taken into account: the government, the central bank and the
household. Let them be denoted by the superscripts G, CB,a n dH.A g g r e g a t e
and sectorial balance sheets are shown in Table 17.
The government holds debt denominated in foreign and domestic currencies,
DG
t and BG
t . For simplicity, the government does not hold money.
The central bank holds international reserves, ACB
t , and government paper,
BCB
t . It also owes money, Ht, to its holder, the household.
The household has foreign assets, AH
t , government paper, BH
t , and money,
Ht.
7The set up in Table 1 may be modiﬁed for other speciﬁcations of sectorial balance sheets.













Table 1: Sectoral balance sheets














Consistency across sectors imposes three conditions. First, that net foreign




that domestic government bonds are in zero net supply, bG
t = bCB
t + bH
t ;a n d























































































According to these constraints, government expenditure must be ﬁnanced
by taxes TH
t , a transfer from the central bank, TCB
t , net public transfers in
the balance of payments, S
T,G
t , and the roll over of foreign and domestic debt
adjusted for the cost of interest.
The uses of funds in the central bank are: a transfer to the government, TCB
t ,
and the change in the diﬀerent assets and liabilities (which may be proved to be
equal to the change in ﬁnancial wealth8. The source of funds in the central bank
8The change in ﬁnancial wealth, in percent of steady state output, is nCB
t − nCB
t−1.
8is the interest on foreign reserves and on government paper. Letting ΠCB
t =0 ,
the central bank budget constraint is an expression either for the transfer from
the central bank to the government or for the central bank’s net worth; the
higher the net worth, the lower the transfer and vice versa9.
The budget constraint of the household states that consumption is ﬁnanced
by disposable income, interest on the household assets, and the rollover of the
household assets. Disposable income is Yt + S
T,H
t − TH
t , where Yt = Wt
Pt Lt is
gross domestic product, S
T,H
t is net private transfers or workers remittances in
the balance of payments, and TH
t is lump sum non-distortionary taxes. The
proﬁts of the two types of ﬁrms, ΠF
t ,10 also accrue to the household.
Since, as noted above, our interest is in an economy that moves along a
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−(1 − πt −
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γ)ht−1 + ht














t +( 1− πt −
_
γ)ht−1 − ht
The budget constraints (11) are combined with the balance sheets (9) to



































t = yt − τH
t − ct


















t−1 +( ρt−1 −
_
γ)bCB










t−1 +( ρt−1 −
_
γ)bH
t−1 − (πt +
_
γ)ht−1
9Jeanne and Svensson (2004) also obtain an equation of this sort.
10As ﬁrms do not hold assets or liabilities, they are not studied in this section.
11It is structural since the numerare is steady state output.
9Expressions (12) for sectorial net worth show that not only the exchange rate
but also primary savings and the cost of interest have an eﬀect on the evolution
of net worth. As will be shown in the section on policy analysis, the primary
balance and the interest service on the debt can have larger and more lasting
eﬀects on the evolution of ﬁnancial wealth than the exchange rate.
On impact, an exchange rate depreciation has diﬀerent eﬀects throughout
sectors. If, as in our simulation exercise, the government is a net debtor in
foreign currency, and the central bank, the household, and the economy as a
whole, net creditors, then, based on expressions (12), an exchange rate depreci-
ation causes net worth to deteriorate in the government sector and to improve
in the central bank, in the household and in the economy as a whole.















Expressions for sectorial net worth have been obtained and a demand for money
will also be derived. In order to complete the derivation of each of the com-
ponents of the sectorial portfolios, we are left to determine the composition of
sectorial claims between those denominated in domestic and foreign currencies.
























































t =( 1− αH)fH
t
In the model, the shares of foreign and domestic assets in the portfolio are
constant.12
2.4 Eﬀect of risk on the exchange rate






12T h ec h o i c eo fp o r t f o l i o ,a sw e l la si t se ﬀects, the eﬀects of foreign exchange intervention)
is beyond the scope of the paper.

















t are the real risk free rates
a th o m ea n da b r o a di na n n u a lt e r m s 13.
As domestic bonds are in zero net supply, a decrease in net foreign assets
changes the country’s portfolio towards the risky domestic asset. As a result,
country risk increases, and the foreign banks will increase the degree of mon-
itoring. The country risk premium will increase. The increase in the risk of
holding domestic securities makes the exchange rate jump on impact so that
the expected appreciation is negative. The expected appreciation equalizes the
return on foreign and domestic assets.
3 The New Open Economy Model
In this section, the remainder of the framework is presented, a NOEM with
inﬂation rigidity, sluggish pass-through, a hypothetical ﬂexible price equilibrium
and market frictions.
Following the “minimalistic” approach of Rotemberg and Woodford (1998)
and McCallum and Nelson (2001) there is no investment or capital in the model.
The inclusion of capital would not make any diﬀerence to the issues of interest
and policy experiments performed. Household consumption, then, accounts for
consumption and investment in a real economy, and the household represents
the private sector.
Besides the three agents already considered in the preceding section, there
are two representative ﬁrms. One produces the home good; the other, distributes
t h ei m p o r t e dg o o d . I nt h em o d e l ,t h er o l eo fﬁrms is to generate price and
inﬂation stickiness. They do not invest or hold ﬁnancial assets, so, there are no
balance sheet eﬀects associated with them.
Firms that distribute the imported good are monopolistic competitors. Firms
that produce the domestic good are monopolistic competitors and also hire labor
in a competitive market. Unlike prices, wages are free to move every period.
The “minimalistic” approach led us to synthesize all public and private ex-
change rate balance sheet eﬀects within the balance sheet of the household.
With the reaction of the household to ﬁnancial wealth in the overall economy,
the reaction of all agents in the real world is represented.
Foreign banks are ﬁnancial intermediaries for the ﬁnancing of domestic ex-
penditure. As in the ﬁnancial accelerator literature, there is asymmetric infor-
mation between foreign lenders and domestic borrowers that generates a spread
between the risky and the risk free interest rates (the extra cost of funds in
13Throughout the paper, the notation Xt+1|t = EtXt+1 will be used to denote the expected
value of variable Xt given information up to time t.
11the emerging market). As explained above, when the balance sheet of the whole
economy deteriorates, country risk increases, foreign banks increase the degree of
monitoring and the country spread increases. In Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1999), the external ﬁnance premium depends inversely on the ratio of net worth
to the ﬁrm’s capital. In our model without a capital stock, the spread depends
negatively on net worth alone14.
Since the model was designed for policy analysis, it is intended to be relevant
empirically. Nominal and real rigidities are, hence, included. The Calvo (1983)
and Yun (1996) type of price rigidity, in the variant of Christiano, Eichembaum
and Evans (2001), Eichembaum and Fisher (2004) and Woodford (2003), is in-
troduced into the model. Real rigidities are introduced in the form of habit
persistence, a type of “catching up with the Joneses”. Following Smets and
Wounters (2004) and Christiano, Eichembaum, Evans (2001), the habit is ex-
ternal.
The most important eﬀects of the exchange rate on output seem to be
demand-driven. For this reason, the supply side of the model is kept as simple as
possible; in particular, the exchange rate does not have any eﬀect on supply15.
The two frictions of the model are a debt elastic risk premium −equation
(18)−, and rule of thumb consumption. The two frictions are important to make
ﬂows and stocks well behaved.
There are two goods, one domestic and one foreign; both goods are tradable.
3.1 Households
There are two members in the household a permanent income consumer and a
rule of thumb consumer. The permanent income consumer solves a standard
maximization problem. The restricted consumer follows a rule of thumb.
3.1.1 The permanent income consumer
























subject to the corresponding budget constraint in (10). Restricted consumption
is taken by the household as a given.
In (20), the quasi-diﬀerence C∆U
















t is the habit in money holdings, where
∼
Ht = Ht/Pt is real balances
of the monetary base, and Lt, is hours worked.
14An alternative approach has been followed by Christiano, Ghust and Roldos (2002). They
keep the capital stock constant.
15For a treatment of the eﬀect of the exchange rate on supply, see also Chistiano, Gust and
Roldos (2002).
12Consumption is determined d periods in advance. Let Xt|t−d ≡ Et−dXt
be the expected value of variable Xt with information given up to time t − d.
Among the ﬁrst order conditions for the household problem are:
(C∆U









and the uncovered interest parity condition (19).16
Let hats denote log deviation from the steady state. In deviation form, from










3.1.2 The rule of thumb consumer
As mentioned above, all balance sheet eﬀects on expenditure are aggregated in
the balance sheet of the household. The behavioral equation for the restricted






where µH > 0.
According to (24), if net worth is above the steady state, rule of thumb
consumption decreases and vice versa.
3.1.3 Domestic and foreign goods
Household consumption is a composite of home and imported goods. The house-



























where (26) is the composite,
_
cF is the steady state share of imports in output,
and υ is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The
16Note that in the Euler equation consumption depends on the risky interest rate.
17Here, the variable rt also means deviation from the steady state. However, in order to
simplify the notation, a hat has been used explicitly only in the cases where it is necessary
to diﬀerenciate the log deviation
∧
xt =l o gXt − log
_








F,t are deﬁned in obvious ways. Optimization gives






























is the CPI, and home and imported consumption is also predetermined d periods.
The rule of thumb consumer also solves the problem of allocating a con-
sumption budget between imported and domestically produced goods.
3.1.4 The demand for consumption
















































Multiplying each type of consumption by its share in output in the steady
state, gives the deviation of each of the components of consumption in percent
of steady state output:







143.1.5 A variety of goods
Consumption of domestically produced goods is a composite of an inﬁnite num-
ber of goods indexed in the interval (0,1) and produced under monopolistic






























is the price index of domestically produced goods.
Consumption of imported goods is also a composite of an inﬁnite number
of goods distributed under monopolistic competition. Following the minimiza-
tion problem described above for domestically produced goods, the household















3.1.6 The demand for money
























i is the nominal interest rate in the steady state. The demand for money
(39) is derived in Appendix C.
3.2 The government
As Woodford (2003) points out, “a ﬁscal policy commitment is an essential part
of a policy framework to achieve macroeconomic stability, in addition to a suit-
able monetary policy commitment.” In our artiﬁcial economy, the government
is committed to following the tax rule
15τH
t = cτyyt − µGnG
t−1 + ετ
t (40)
where µG > 0.
Within our calibration, by combining ﬁrst, equation (40); second, the ex-
pression for the government balance in (13); and third, the linear version of
equation (12),18 a bounded process for net worth obtains.19




3.3 The central bank






where µCB > 0.
Besides determining the transfer to the government, the central bank is
committed to following the Taylor rule:
i
f
t = πt+1|t + ro
t +0 .75(πt − πTAR
t )+0 .5(yt − yo
t) − ciχχt+1|t (43)
where yo
t is the deviation of output from the steady state if prices were ﬂexible,
ro
t is the natural real interest rate, that is, the interest rate that would hold if
prices were ﬂexible, and the coeﬃcient ciχ is nonnegative.20
The coeﬃcient ciχ takes values according to the two policies studied in the
paper. In the simulations, ciχ =0is used for ﬂoating, and, ciχ > 0 f o rf e a ro f
ﬂoating.
3.4 The foreign country
























These expressions are derived in Appendix B.
18The linear version of the model is in Appendix 1.
19In the terminology of Woodford (2003), this implies that the government follows a ﬁscal
policy that is locally Ricardian.
20T h ee x c h a n g er a t ei sd e ﬁned as the number of domestic currency units per unit of foreign
currency. The expected depreciation enters the policy rule with a negative sign because,
given a long run real exchange rate of zero, a negative expected depreciation means that the
exchange rate is depreciated. The real exchange rate in the policy rule is also written in terms
of expected changes because the exchange rate enters the uncovered interest parity condition
in terms of expected changes.
163.5 Price and inﬂation stickiness







Let us now turn to the study of how each of the components on the right
hand side of equation (45) is determined.
3.5.1 Inﬂation of domestically produced goods
As in the case of the consumption of domestically produced goods, government
expenditure and exports are also a composite of an inﬁnite number of goods.
The domestic and foreign households as well as the government all solve the
problem in equations (35) and (36). Each one of them demands good j accord-
ing to equation (37), and according to similar expressions for Gj,t and C∗
F,j,t.
Aggregate demand for good j is hence Yj,t = CH,j,t +Gj,t +C∗








Firms face the demand curve (46) and produce under the constant returns
to scale production function Yj,t = ZtLt, where Zt is the technology factor. The





Lt + MCt(Yj,t − ZtLt) (47)
where MCt is real marginal cost and Wt is the nominal wage.





Product and consumption wages in real terms are deﬁned as XH,t = Wt/PH,t,
and Xt = Wt/Pt respectively. It can be shown that, given the steady state con-











where, Φt ≡ PF,t/Pt, is a measure of the real exchange rate.
According to equations (22) and (49), the real product wage is, in turn, a
function of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor,
and of the exchange rate Φt. In addition, labor is given by
Lt = Yt/Zt
17Let us now turn to the ﬁrm’s dynamic problem. A ﬁrm that produces a
domestic good reoptimizes its price with probability ωH. If the ﬁrm does not re-
optimize, it changes the price by a proportion γπ









PH,j,t be the optimal price chosen by the ﬁrm when it reoptimizes.
Deﬁne Xt,l =( γπ
H)lπtπt+1πt+2...πt+l−1 for l ≥ 1 and Xt,l =1for l =0 .





The problem of the ﬁrm is to pick an optimal price
∼














In the symmetric solution, all ﬁrms choose the same price. So, subscript j



























































H,t−1 and linearizing around πH,t =0 ,
Christiano, Eichembaum and Evans (2001) propose the Phillips curve that, in




(1 − βωH)(1 − ωH)
ωH
mct|t−d (52)
where inﬂation is predetermined d periods, and π∆
H,t = πH,t − γπ
HπH,t−1 is the
quasi-diﬀerence of inﬂa t i o ni nt h ep r i c eo fg o o d sp r o d u c e dd o m e s t i c a l l y .
3.5.2 Inﬂation of imported goods
When the pass-through is complete and immediate, the law of one price holds.
Under complete and immediate pass-through, the domestic price of foreign
goods is PF
t = P∗
t + Et,i nl e v e l s ,a n dπF,t = ξt + π∗
t,i nﬁrst diﬀerences.
18Following Monacelli (2003), if the pass-through is sluggish, the law of one
price does not hold, and the gap of the law of one price can be deﬁned in levels
as ψt = Et + P∗
t − PF,t and in ﬁrst diﬀerences, as
ψt = ψt−1 + ξt + π∗
t − πF,t (53)
Following the Calvo-Yun set up described above for domestically produced
goods, Monacelli (2003) introduces sticky prices into inﬂa t i o no fi m p o r t e dg o o d s .
The distributor ﬁrm faces the demand curve (38) and gets to reoptimize its price
with probability ωF. If the ﬁrm does not reoptimize, it changes its price in a
proportion γπ
F of past inﬂa t i o no fi m p o r t e dg o o d s .T h eﬁrm purchases the good
at the price EtP∗
t and sells it at the price PF,t .I f ψt > 0, the ﬁrm bears a
cost of ψt for each unit it distributes. The problem of the distributor ﬁrm is to















where the demand for the imported goods is given by (38).
Assume inﬂation of imported goods is also predetermined d periods. Follow-
ing the derivation of the Phillips curve for inﬂation of domestically produced
goods, Monacelli (2003) proposes an expression for inﬂa t i o no fi m p o r t e dg o o d s




(1 − βωF)(1 − ωF)
ωF
ψt|t−d (55)
A nominal depreciation, or a positive shock to foreign inﬂation results in an
increase in the law of one price gap ψt. The higher the law of one price gap, the
higher the pressure it imposes on inﬂa t i o no fi m p o r t e dg o o d sa n dv i c ev e r s a .
3.6 The ﬂexible price equilibrium
3.6.1 Prices
If prices were ﬂexible, ωH and ωF in equations (52) and (55), or the probabilitties
that ﬁrms keep their prices at the level of the previous period (adjusted for a
proportion of lagged inﬂation), would be zero. In this case, the relative price
chosen by the ﬁrm would be equal to either a constant markup over marginal
cost (in the case of the producing ﬁrm) or over the law of one price gap (in the
case of the distributor ﬁrm).
From equation (51) and a similar expression for inﬂa t i o no fi m p o r t e dg o o d s ,









θ−1Ψt. As the equilibrium is symmetric across ﬁrms, the
relative optimal price is one, and both the marginal cost and the gap of the law
of one price are constant.





and would do so costliesstly since under ﬂexible prices the eﬀect of monetary
p o l i c yo np r i c e sw o u l db ei n ﬁnite.
















3.6.2 Flexible price output and demand
Under ﬂexible prices, output would follow
yo
t = zt + lo
t (57)
where, from equations (22), (49) and (48), respectively,
lo









Although there are no nominal rigidities in the ﬂexible price equilibrium,
real rigidities are maintained. There is habit persistence in consumption, and
consumption is predetermined d periods.






F,t|t−d) − gt|t−d − cRo
t|t−d + εCUo
t





















If prices were ﬂexible and the real interest rate were equal to the Wicksellian
interest rate, output would equal the ﬂexible price output and the output gap
would be zero.
The complete ﬂexible price equilibrium as well as the complete model in
deviation form appear in Appendix A.
204 A sudden stop
In June-July 2002 emerging market bond spreads increased with the increase in
the US high yield.21 Capital ﬂow to emerging markets subsided. In this section,
the eﬀect of an exogenous increase in bond spreads, on variables such as output,
inﬂation, capital ﬂow and debt is simulated and the diﬀerence in their response
to diﬀerent monetary policies is studied.
The simulation is intended to be quantitatively relevant. The shock is a one
percentage point increase in the country risk premium for four quarters. As the
model used for the simulation is linear, the impulse response functions can be
multiplied by any constant.22 23
4.1 Fear of ﬂoating as the benchmark
The monetary authority can react to the increase in the country risk premium
with a policy mix of exchange rate depreciation and higher policy interest rate.
As fear of ﬂoating is the norm, we use this case as the benchmark. The per-
formance of the economy during a sudden stop and under a policy of fear of
ﬂoating is reported in Figures 1 to 3.
A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e s1a n d2 ,t h ei m m e d i a t ee ﬀect of the increase in the
country risk premium is a sharp increase in the risky rate due to increases in
b o t ht h es p r e a di t s e l fa n di nt h ep o l i c yr a t e .T h ei n c r e a s ei nt h ep o l i c yr a t ei s
about 7/10 of the increase in the spread. Within our calibration of the reaction
function of the central bank, ciχ =1 6 , the real exchange rate depreciates 0.15%
per point increase in the country risk premium.24
4.2 The transfer problem, overall and by sector
In the model, the unanticipated increase in the country risk premium causes an
unanticipated outﬂow of capital −which in our model is a sudden stop. The
capital outﬂow can be understood in two ways. First, it is the result of a drop
in consumption that is greater than the drop in output (Figure 1-C). Second, it
is the result of an increase in exports and a larger drop in imports (Figure 1-D).
In our parameterization, output decreases by more than 0.9 percentage points
per percentage point increase in the country risk premium.25
21In the three months starting May 2002, the Brazilian EMBI increased 10.5 percentage
points and in the three months starting June 2002, the Colombian EMBI increased 4.7 per-
centage points.
22The conclusions are robust to the length of the shock as long as it is transitory.
23T h ea n a l y s i ss t a r t sa tt h em o m e n tc o n ﬁdence in the country is lost and the country risk
premium increases. The debt crises at the beginning of the eighties and the ﬁnancial crises of
emerging markets at the end of the nineties were preceded by expansionary expenditure and
borrowing. This was not the case during the events of 2002 and has no bearing on the current
simulation exercise.
24A larger value of ciχ can be used for a ﬁxed real exchange rate. However, we prefered
to make a case for high exchange rate rigidity, although not for a completely ﬁxed exchange
rate.
25Recall that all ﬂow and stock variables are measured in per cent of steady state output.
21While total primary savings increase, the burden of the transfer is not equally
shared by all sectors (Figure 2). In the initial quarters of the shock, tax revenue
drops and the decrease in tax receipts turns the government primary balance into
ad e ﬁcit (Figure 2-A). On average, in the ﬁrst two years the primary structural
balance is −0.43% per point increase in the country risk premium. While the
government primary balance is in deﬁcit, the private sector is in surplus (Figure
2-C). On average, in the ﬁrst two years private savings are 0.64% of steady state
output. This is the result of a drop in consumption that is larger than the drop
in disposable income (Figure 2-C).
The trade balance improves at the time that output falls. This pro-cyclical
behavior of the trade balance increases the volatility of absorption over and
above that of output.26
4.3 Under fear of ﬂoating the debt grows
Although the exchange rate is controlled, government debt skyrockets (Figure 3-
A).27 The main cause of the increase in government debt is not the depreciation
of the exchange rate, which is moderate. It turns out that the most important
element that causes the huge increase in public debt is the increase in the policy
interest rate. The reason is that the increase in interest rates causes both an
increase in the cost of servicing the debt and, through recession and decreased
tax receipts, a government deﬁcit28.
The evolution of total and sectorial ﬁnancial wealth is explained in Figure
3. As a result of the moderate depreciation, government debt jumps on impact
by a relatively small amount, 0.2% of steady state output. During the ﬁrst year
of the experiment, due to the increase in the cost of interest, government debt
increases strongly and cumulatively by more than 5 percentage points of output!
Eventually, as the increase in government debt leads to increased tax revenues,
government debt gradually returns to the steady state.
The evolution of the wealth of the private sector is the mirror image of that
of the government. The reason is that the former has net assets in foreign
and domestic currencies while the later has, in both currencies, net liabilities
(Figures 3-B and 3-D).
Central bank ﬁnancial wealth does not increase with the higher income re-
ceived on international reserves and government paper. The reason is that,
according to the speciﬁcation of the transfer from the central bank to the gov-
ernment, this higher central bank income is transferred to the government im-
mediately.
26According to the permanent income hypothesis, savings should buﬀer the eﬀect of transi-
tory changes in income on consumption; capital ﬂow and the trade balance should be counter-
cyclical. This could be the case in mature markets and also under transitory shocks to income,
but not in emerging markets during sudden stops.
27In the graph, an increase in debt is a negative change because government ﬁnancial wealth
is negativethat is, ﬁnancial wealth is debt. Also, interest income is negative; it is a cost.
28Throughout the experiment, it is assumed that the increase in the interest service of the
debt and the decrease in tax revenue do not lead to cuts in expenditure in other items of the
budget. To fulﬁll this assumption, government expenditure is simply kept unchanged.
224.4 Under ﬂoating, the debt jumps
We now use the NOEM with sectorial balance sheets and stock and ﬂow con-
sistency to simulate a sudden stop under an exchange rate that ﬂoats. The
exercise is reported in Figures 4 to 7. The purpose of the exercise is to study
the consequences of fear of ﬂoating in general, and it is also suggestive of a
policy issue that has not received enough attention. During the events in 2002
described above, the reaction of monetary policy in Brazil was to tighten the
policy interest rate while the reaction in Colombia was to allow the exchange
rate to ﬂoat.
As shown in Figures 4-A, 4-C and 4-E, as a result of the increase in the
country risk premium, under the ﬂexible approach the exchange rate depreci-
ates. More interestingly, there is an additional depreciation due to the counter-
cyclical easing of monetary policy in the model. Within our parameterization,
the depreciation is about 1.1% per point increase in the country risk premium.
As revealed by Figures 4-B, 4-D and 4-F, whether the exchange rate is rigid
or ﬂexible, there is a transfer problem. Roughly the same transfer is made in
t h ec a s eo faﬂoating exchange rate under macroeconomic stability and in the
case of fear of ﬂoating in the midst of recession.
As shown in Figure 5-B, in comparison with the benchmark, a ﬂoating ex-
change rate makes the eﬀect of the exchange rate on government debt larger
(government debt jumps on impact by about 1.1 percentage points of output
i n s t e a do f0 . 1 %u n d e rf e a ro fﬂoating). However, this eﬀect takes place on im-
pact only. In the subsequent quarters, as the interest service on the debt as well
as the primary balance are smaller, public debt remains relatively stable.
In sum, a ﬂoating exchange rate stabilizes government debt, a rigid exchange
rate increases government debt.
Figure 6 contrasts each of the components on the right hand side of equation
(12) (with the exception of net transfers) under both the rigid and the ﬂexible
approaches to the exchange rate. A ﬂoating exchange rate decreases both the
cost of interest for the government and the government primary deﬁcit (Figures
6-A and 6-C). The ﬂexible approach also increases the eﬀect of the exchange
rate on government debt, but this is an eﬀect that takes place on impact only.
Floating also sizably cuts interest income and the primary surplus in the private
sector (Figures 6-B and 6-D) and increases the impact eﬀect of the exchange
rate on private ﬁnancial wealth (Figure 6-F).
4.5 The transfer problem by sector
While the economy as a whole transfers savings abroad −runs a trade surplus−
regardless of whether the policy is fear of ﬂoating or ﬂoating (Figure 4-F), the
public and private sectors run a surplus or a deﬁcit according to the policy
implemented. Under fear of ﬂoating, the burden of the transfer is born by the
private sector while the government runs a deﬁcit (Figures 6-C and 6-D). Tax
collection plummets along with output, and the decrease in tax revenue leads
the government balance into a deﬁcit precisely when the economy as a whole
23runs a surplus. Under ﬂoating, the government may not run a deﬁcit (Figure
6-C).
4.6 The pass-through, not a problem
In the case of a ﬂoat, quarterly depreciation of the nominal exchange rate reaches
an annual rate of 4.6% (Figure 7-A). The eﬀect of exchange rate depreciation
on the inﬂation of imported goods is tamed and somewhat lagged. Imported
inﬂation increases by 1.0% in quarter one (Figure 7-B). At the same time, the
recession causes inﬂation of domestically produced goods to decrease (Figure 7-
C). As the combined eﬀect of the increase in inﬂa t i o no fi m p o r t e dg o o d sa n dt h e
decrease in inﬂation of domestically produced goods, CPI inﬂa t i o ni nt h es h o r t
run does not increase (Figure 7-D). It may be argued that this result relies upon
the particular speciﬁcation and parameterization of the model, in particular, on




F =0 .195. T h es a m ee x e r c i s ew a sr e p e a t e dw i t ha
higher degree of openness and it was found that the eﬀe c to fi m p o r t e di n ﬂation
on the CPI, whatever its size, can be only transitory. The reason is that, after
a few quarters, imported inﬂation drops below CPI inﬂation thereby pushing
CPI inﬂation down.
4.7 Counter-cyclical policy
It is worthwhile to emphasize that the important policy issue in regards to
ﬂoating the exchange rate is that under a sudden stop, the policy interest rate
eases. This stance is counter-cyclical since it oﬀsets the recessive eﬀect of the
increase in the country risk premium. Furthermore, as tax revenue does not
drop along with output, the government is not in deﬁcit and hence it does not
need to implement a pro-cyclical cut in expenditure.
The question of the stance of the monetary policy under an outﬂow of capital
has also been studied by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003). Based on a
diﬀerent model, they also concluded that fear of ﬂoating is pro-cyclical and
ﬂoating, counter-cyclical.
4.8 Fear of ﬂoating and the reduction of inﬂation
Under the rigid approach to the exchange rate, the tightening of monetary policy
keeps the exchange rate fairly constant, but at the cost of the “decapitation of
the entrepreneurial class” (Figure 4-B). The recession, in turn, causes a sharp
drop in inﬂation (Figure 7-D)29. In our model, the drop in output and inﬂation
are about one percent per percentage point increase in the spread. The reduction
in inﬂation in Brazil and Colombia at the end of the nineties seems to have
been attributed almost exclusively to inﬂation targeting. We contend that the
29In the model, inﬂation returns to the initial steady state target of zero, but in the recently
adopted inﬂation targeting regimes of Brazil and Colombia the authorities met the recession-
led reduction in inﬂation with opportunistic (and welcomed) decreases in the inﬂation target.
24decrease in inﬂation in these as well as in other countries at the end of the
nineties was also the result of the defense of the crawling bands.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In an emerging market, what can make the diﬀerence between solvency and
bankruptcy is not the exchange rate but the management of the policy interest
rate. This conclusion has been reached by developing a framework for macro-
economic stability in emerging market economies with a set of exchange rate
exposed sectorial balance sheets and with sectorial stock and ﬂow consistency.
The model was used in the study of a sudden stop that was endogenous to a
shock to the country risk premium. The claims that foreign currency liabilities
and the pass-through of the exchange rate to inﬂation prevent the exchange rate
from ﬂoating were evaluated and were found to be weak.
An exogenous shock to the country risk premium −and endogenous unantici-
pated capital outﬂow− was studied under two speciﬁcations of monetary policy:
fear of ﬂoating and ﬂoating. Under fear of ﬂoating, it was shown that the sud-
den stop causes a drop in output, and the drop in output causes a reduction in
inﬂation.
A l t h o u g ht h ed r o pi no u t p u ti ss i z a b l e ,t h ed r o pi na b s o r p t i o ni sl a r g e r .T h e
reasons for the larger drop in absorption are; ﬁrst, that during a sudden stop
the trade balance rises; and second, that a trade surplus is savings. The drop
in output is not cushioned by savings as in a mature market. On the contrary,
under a sudden stop the behavior of the trade balance is pro-cyclical.
While studying the transfer problem by sector, it was found that under fear
of ﬂoating, the transfer is done by the private sector in the midst of a recession,
and that under ﬂoating, the government balance may not run a deﬁcit.
Finally, and surprisingly, we found that fear of ﬂoating, the policy that
attempts to prevent foreign debt from increasing, results precisely in an increase
in the debt to GDP ratio. Fear of ﬂoating prevents a transitory impact increase
in the level of the debt to GDP ratio. But, since it increases the interest cost
on the debt and causes a ﬁscal deﬁcit, it increases the change in the debt ratio.
Under a ﬂoating exchange rate, government debt stabilizes. The reason is
that, although the depreciation causes a transitory increase in the level of the
debt to GDP ratio, the smaller increase in the cost of interest and the improved
government balance decrease the change in the debt to GDP ratio.
The policy implication is that under a sudden stop, countries with high
government debt or countries whose inﬂation is in the low single digits would
perform better by ﬂoating the exchange rate. Foreign debt will jump on impact,
but will grow less. Countries whose inﬂation is still high, provided the debt to
GDP ratio is low, may undertake an opportunistic approach to the reduction of
inﬂation and may respond to the capital outﬂow with a strong defense of the
exchange rate. Although this policy would increase the growth of debt, it will
certainly reduce inﬂation.
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286 Appendix A. The complete model in deviation
form
6.1 Prices


























(1 − βωH)(1 − ωH)
ωH
κF =
(1 − βωF)(1 − ωF)
ωF
6.2 Supply
mct = xH,t − zt
zt = γzzt−1 + εz
t
xH,t = xt + δψt





lt = yt − zt
6.3 Exchange rates
qt = qt+1 − 0.25[(i
f




χt =4 ( qt − qt−1)
ξt =4 ( qt − qt−1) − π∗
t + πt
ϕt = qt − ψt
ψt = ψt−1 +0 .25(ξt + π∗
t − πF,t)






t = πt+1|t + ro
t +0 .75(πt − πTAR




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































316.9 The steady state
_






































































































































































































































































































































































F=0 .9 cτy=0 .8
µH=0 .03 γπ
H=0 .9 cφn=0 .03









6.11 Flexible price equilibrium
The equations of the price, supply, and interest rate blocks are explicitly reported.
The equations for the blocks on exchange rates, ﬂows, savings, interest cost and stocks
are identical to those presented for the case of the rigid price equilibrium.
6.11.1 Prices
πo

















t = zt + lo
t
lo




















































7 Appendix B. The foreign economy



































which is one of the two equations in (44).
Also in the foreign economy, consumption is a composite of home and im-





























Let Et be the exchange rate and use PF,t = PH,t/Et. The problem of the foreign














which is one of the two equations in (44).
8 Appendix C. The demand for money



































34The household problem may be written













































The ﬁrst order condition with respect to real consumption and real money
balances are
(C∆
















































which is equation (39).
35Figure 1. A shock to the country risk premium,
Main prices and flows
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Real risk free rate
C. The transfer problem in the aggregate




























D. The transfer problem in the aggregate












ImportsFigure 2. A shock to the country risk premium,
The transfer problem by sector
A. Government




















































Net foreign assetsFigure 3. A shock to the country risk premium,
Impact of savings and of the cost of interst on net worth
A. Government debt and the cost of interest











C. Government debt and the primary balance











B. Private wealth and the cost of interest












D. Private wealth and primary saving











Primary savingsFigure 4. Effect of floating the exchange rate
on the main prices and flows
A. Real risk free rate
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E. Real exchange rate












































Fear of floatingFigure 5. Effect of floating the exchange rate
on net worth
A. Net foreign assets











C. Central bank financial wealth





















D. Private financial wealth










Fear of floatingFigure 6. Effect of floating the exchange rate
on the causes of the change in net worth
A. Cost of interest on government debt











C. Primary government balance













E. Effect of the exchange rate on government debt












B. Interest income on private assets





















F. Effect of the exchange rate on private financial wealth











Fear of floatingFigure 7. Effect of floating the exchange rate
on the pass-through
A. Nominal exchange rate depreciation











C. Home goods inflation












B. Imported goods inflation
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